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HEALTH CARE’S OTHER “BIG DEAL”: 
DIRECT PRIMARY CARE REGULATION IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 
GLENN E. CHAPPELL† 
ABSTRACT 
  Direct primary care is a promising, market-based alternative to the 
fee-for-service payment structure that shapes doctor–patient 
relationships in America. Instead of billing patients and insurers 
service by service, direct primary care doctors charge their patients a 
periodic, prenegotiated fee in exchange for providing a wide range of 
healthcare services and increased availability compared to traditional 
practices. This “subscription” model is intended to eliminate the 
administrative burdens associated with insurer interaction, which, in 
theory, allows doctors to spend more time with their patients and less 
time doing paperwork. 
  Direct practices have become increasingly popular since Congress 
passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA). This growth has been driven 
by legislation in several states that resolves a number of legal 
questions that slowed the model’s growth and by the ACA’s 
recognition of the model as a permissible way to cover primary care 
in “approved” health plans. Yet legal scholars have hardly focused on 
direct primary care. Given the model’s growth, however, the time is 
ripe for a more focused legal inquiry. 
  This Note begins that inquiry. After tracing the model’s evolution 
and its core components, this Note substantively examines the laws in 
states that regulate direct practices and analyzes how those laws 
address a number of potential policy concerns. It then analyzes direct 
primary care’s broader role in the contemporary American healthcare 
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marketplace. Based upon that analysis, this Note concludes that direct 
primary care is a beneficial innovation that harmonizes well with a 
cooperative-federalism-based healthcare policy model. 
INTRODUCTION 
Joe Biden was right: the ACA was a “big [expletive] deal.”1 The 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA)2 
sufficiently assaulted the status quo within the American healthcare 
system3 to spur frequent comparisons to sweeping domestic-policy 
reforms of times past.4 Yet when compared to the momentous social 
upheavals engineered by the New Deal and the Great Society, the 
ACA’s reforms swept far narrower.5 By primarily reorienting the 
insurance marketplace to expand coverage to millions of previously 
uninsured patients,6 the ACA channels those patients into the 
primary healthcare7 pool8 while leaving the current delivery structure 
 
 1. See Rachel Weiner, Biden to Obama: “A Big [Expletive] Deal,” WASH. POST  
(Mar. 23, 2010), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/03/did-biden-tell-obama-signing-
w.html [http://perma.cc/C82C-WW3E] (“After introducing Obama at Tuesday’s health-care bill 
signing ceremony, Vice President Biden turned to the [P]resident and said, ‘This is a big 
[expletive] deal.’”). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
26 U.S.C.).  
 3. See Thomas R. Barker, A Critical Analysis of Provisions of the Affordable Care Act 
Affecting the Life Sciences Industry, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 67, 67 (2011) (stating that 
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) “made sweeping reforms to the American health care 
system”).  
 4. See, e.g., Jonathan Oberlander, Long Time Coming: Why Health Reform Finally 
Passed, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1112, 1113 (2010) (asserting that the Affordable Care Act was 
“ambitious” and “similar in scope to Great Society and New Deal programs”). 
 5. See Paul Krugman, The Big Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2013, at A21 (“[W]here the New 
Deal had a revolutionary impact, empowering workers and creating a middle-class society that 
lasted for 40 years, the [ACA] has been limited to equalizing policies at the margin.”). 
 6. See Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterich, Social and Legal Debate About the 
Affordable Care Act, 80 UMKC L. REV. 45, 52 (2011) (“The [Affordable Care] Act promises to 
extend health care coverage to millions of people.”). 
 7. Primary health care consists of all first-line, nonspecialized medical services, including 
“health promotion, disease prevention, health maintenance, counseling, patient education, 
diagnosis and treatment of acute and chronic illnesses in a variety of health care settings.” 
Primary Care, AM. ACAD. OF FAM. PHYSICIANS, http://www.aafp.org/about/policies/all/primary-
care.html [https://perma.cc/FP5E-5DKM].  
 8. See Stacey A. Tovino, I Need a Doctor: A Critique of Medicare Financing of Graduate 
Medical Education, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2431, 2433 (2014) (“The United States has a 
growing population, an aging population, and an increasing number of residents with health 
insurance coverage as a result of the Affordable Care Act.”). 
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in place.9 A policy conundrum thus hides in the regulatory gaps: 
although the ACA prescribes many initiatives designed to counteract 
the acute woes afflicting our healthcare system, delivery 
infrastructure is equally, or perhaps more, important to the patient’s 
long-term health.  
The current infrastructure—the fee-for-service model—has 
arisen out of the unique interaction of a partly socialized and heavily 
regulated insurance marketplace10 with market-driven healthcare 
delivery systems.11 Under the fee-for-service model, physicians charge 
patients a separate, unbundled price for each performed service.12 For 
example, a typical fee-for-service transaction proceeds like this13: 
First, a patient with a bothersome cough visits her primary care 
provider for a diagnosis. Second, during her consultation, the doctor 
checks her throat, lymph nodes, and vital signs; draws blood and 
sends it off for lab work; and prescribes a common antibiotic to treat 
an upper respiratory infection. Third, assuming she has adequate 
insurance, the patient pays the co-pay for which she is responsible 
before leaving the appointment. Fourth, her doctor separately bills 
her insurance for the doctor visit, the lab work, and the prescription. 
Fifth, her insurance pays its share under the insurance agreement. 
Finally, the insurer bills the patient for the remaining balance. 
Against this backdrop, a quiet and self-directed alternative to the 
fee-for-service delivery model has evolved since well before the 
ACA’s enactment. Although this alternative model has not gone 
unnoticed,14 it has gradually expanded throughout the United States 
 
 9. Dolgin & Dieterich, supra note 6, at 52, 55 (2011) (observing that, at heart, “[t]he 
[ACA] expands health care coverage to many people” but continues to “safeguard[] the role of 
the profit-making health insurance industry”).  
 10. ROBERT I. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY, 
CONFRONTATION, AND COMPROMISE 3 (2006) (“Health care is among the most heavily 
regulated industries in America. Virtually every aspect of the system is subject to government 
oversight in one form or another, and often in several forms.”).  
 11. Michael E. Porter & Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, Redefining Competition in Health 
Care, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2004, at 65 (“[I]n the United States, health care is largely private 
and subject to more competition than virtually anyplace else in the world.”).  
 12. Fee-for-Service, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 259 (11th ed. 2003). 
 13. See generally Neelam K. Sekhri, Managed Care: The US Experience, 78 BULL. WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. 830 (2000) (providing an overview of fee-for-service transactions in the United 
States). 
 14. See generally Jeffrey B. Hammond, Cash Only Doctors: Challenges and Prospects of 
Autonomy and Access, 80 UMKC L. REV. 307 (2012) (discussing the rise of “cash only” medical 
practices). 
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with relatively little discussion.15 That model is direct primary care, in 
which patients pay a periodic—usually monthly—flat-rate fee for all 
or most of their primary medical care, usually without insurer 
involvement.16  
This model is neither novel nor radical. Indeed, proponents tout 
it as a “throwback” to the days of individualized care and close 
doctor–patient relationships.17 Yet it is notable and worth examining 
anew because of its recent revival—a revival that has evaded 
extensive scholarly discussion, even though it will likely gain 
substantial momentum in the coming years. This momentum will be 
driven by a wave of recent state legislation that legitimizes direct 
primary care and resolves some of the legal uncertainties surrounding 
it. In all, fourteen states have statutorily recognized direct practices—
including eight that have passed nearly identical legislation within the 
past three years—and more states might follow.18 Although the 
statutes differ in some respects, all achieve the same overarching goal 
of recognizing and regulating the direct primary care model. These 
statutes exempt direct practices from state insurance regulations, 
mandate certain content and disclosure requirements within direct 
care agreements, prohibit direct practices from billing insurers for 
their services, and specify the conditions and timeframes under which 
direct practice agreements may be terminated.19  
This Note canvasses the historical development of these statutes 
and informs the reader of the legal and policy debates surrounding 
them. It also clarifies that although the direct primary care model is a 
subset of the general category of “concierge” practices, it differs 
significantly in structure and operation. Then, it provides an overview 
of the most important substantive provisions within the statutes and 
 
 15. See CAROL PECKHAM, MEDSCAPE, MEDSCAPE PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION REPORT 
2015, at 18 (2015), http://www.medscape.com/features/slideshow/compensation/2015/public/
overview#page=18 [http://perma.cc/2B3T-LS7C] (noting that nonmanaged care doctors—
including “concierge” and cash-only doctors—represent 8 percent of all physicians surveyed, a 
two-fold increase since 2011).  
 16. Hammond, supra note 14, at 307; Am. Acad. of Family Physicians, DPC: An 
Alternative to Fee-for-Service, AAFP.ORG, http://www.aafp.org/practice-
management/payment/dpc.html [https://perma.cc/6SQJ-KQQF]. 
 17. See Robert M. Portman, Concierge Care: Back to the Future of Medicine?, HEALTH 
LAW., Aug. 2003, at 1, 3 (observing that the various forms of prepaid medical practices are 
“frequently touted as a throwback to the way medicine used to be practiced”).  
 18. For further discussion of recent state legislation and possible future developments, see 
infra Parts I.D, I.F. 
 19. For further discussion of the statutes’ shared provisions, see infra Part II. 
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distinguishes the differences among the participating states’ 
approaches. Finally, it examines the statutes’ effectiveness in 
addressing the legal and policy issues that have bedeviled concierge 
practices since their inception as well as their broader role in the 
American healthcare marketplace. This Note places particular 
attention upon the doctor shortage, a particularly pressing challenge 
to healthcare policymakers in the coming years.20  
Based upon that analysis, this Note concludes by suggesting that 
despite some significant shortcomings, the direct primary care model 
is on balance a positive development within the contemporary 
American healthcare landscape. Because each state faces unique 
challenges to healthcare access and quality, each state should retain 
discretion to reform its delivery infrastructure in accordance with 
those challenges.21 And given the level of uncertainty with respect to 
the model’s impact on the healthcare system as a whole, individual 
states are suitable places to evaluate pressing questions about its 
short- and long-term impacts, including whether the model provides 
better, cheaper care when compared to the traditional fee-for-service 
model and whether its expansion places undue stress on healthcare 
access. Therefore, if, as this Note suggests, state autonomy and 
experimentation are accepted as desirable in the healthcare 
marketplace, state legitimization and individual regulation of the 
model is exactly how the regulatory cookie should crumble. 
I.  A PRIMER ON DIRECT PRIMARY CARE 
A. Distinguishing Direct Primary Care Practices from Other 
Concierge Models 
Although commentators often use the two terms 
interchangeably, direct practices and concierge medicine are not 
always the same. The easiest way to understand this relationship is to 
think of direct practices as one member of the much broader 
 
 20. See, e.g., Shawn Tully, America’s Painful Doctor Shortage Is Threatening Health Care 
Reform, FORTUNE (Mar. 4, 2014, 3:28 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/03/04/americas-painful-
doctor-shortage-is-threatening-health-care-reform [http://perma.cc/VF8L-SVM6]. 
 21. Notably, many of the states that have recently adopted direct practice legislation are 
those most heavily affected by the nationwide physician shortage. For a discussion of this 
shortage, see infra notes 201–02 and accompanying text.  
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concierge-medicine family.22 “Concierge medicine” is often used as a 
blanket term to describe an array of different healthcare delivery 
models united only by their departure from the traditional fee-for-
service payment scheme.23 Such a catchall term is perhaps 
understandable given these models’ simultaneous development since 
the turn of the millennium.24 In addition, all concierge-medicine 
models, including direct primary care, share the same goal to provide 
more personalized and higher-quality health care for each patient–
member.25 But concierge care and direct primary care use different 
strategies to achieve that shared end goal.26  
For example, under one commonly discussed model, the “pure 
concierge model,” patients pay a premium in addition to the fees they 
pay to their doctor for the primary care services they receive.27 
Normally, those service fees are billed to third-party insurers under a 
normal fee-for-service arrangement.28 This added revenue allows 
doctors to reduce the total number of patients they see while 
maintaining the same, or higher, net income.29 As a result, waiting 
 
 22. Cf. Hammond, supra note 14, at 317 (noting that cash-only practices—which operate 
similar to, yet still distinct from, direct practices—must be distinguished from concierge 
practices, their “first cousin[s]”). 
 23. See, e.g., Sandra J. Carnahan, Law, Medicine, and Wealth: Does Concierge Medicine 
Promote Health Care Choice, or Is It a Barrier to Access?, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 121, 122, 
130–32 (2006) (categorizing three distinct alternative delivery models, including direct practices, 
as variations of “Concierge Medical Practice Structures”); Jeffrey M. Pecore & James F. 
Doherty, Jr., Practice of “Concierge” Medicine: Models and Legal Issues, 42 MD. B.J. 12, 14 
(2009) (electing to use the term “concierge medicine” to describe multiple delivery models—
including direct primary care—because that term “has become the most widely known”). 
 24. For further discussion on the two models’ shared history, see infra Part I.B. 
 25. See Gwendolyn Roberts Majette, From Concierge Medicine to Patient-Centered Medical 
Homes: International Lessons & the Search for a Better Way to Deliver Primary Health Care in 
the U.S., 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 585, 586 (2009) (noting that concierge medicine was created by 
physicians in an effort “to improve the delivery of primary care”).  
 26. See Rachael Zimlich, The Direct Primary Care Model Is Gaining Traction. Is It Right 
For You?, MED. ECON. (July 10, 2013), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-
economics/content/tags/david-usher-md/direct-primary-care-model-gaining-traction-it-right-yo 
[https://perma.cc/5Y3V-3VLB] (“Direct primary care (DPC) is a retainer-based model for 
primary care practices, but does not come with a standard set of rules like many other [retainer-
based] models. Instead, there is a common set of goals or characteristics . . . .”). 
 27. See J. Kevin Markwell, Concierge Medical Practices Within the Regulated Medicine 
Environment: Are They Ethical, Workable, Legal?, 2 HEALTH L. & POL’Y 22, 22 (2008). 
 28. See id. (“The more common concierge practice does accept reimbursement from 
private health insurance and Medicare. In fact, the annual concierge fee is not intended to pay 
for specific medical service such as labs, x-rays, medicines or other services covered by the 
patient’s primary payer.”). 
 29. See id. at 23 (“The profound allure of a concierge practice is that it offers the 
marvelously counterintuitive double incentive of a less hectic pace, although perhaps less 
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room times are eliminated or drastically reduced, and each doctor 
provides longer visits and more individualized care for each patient.30 
Some practices offer “luxury” services as well, including slippers and 
robes, twenty-four-hour phone or internet access to a physician, and 
comprehensive, personalized initial health assessments for all new 
patients beyond the scope of traditional preventive-care exams.31 
Therefore, pure concierge models can be properly categorized as 
charging an access premium.  
In contrast, direct practices employ a different strategy to 
improve primary care quality and reduce the number of patients seen 
by each physician.32 Rather than imposing an access premium to make 
up for lost revenues resulting from fewer patients, direct practices 
reduce overhead costs arising from billing third-party insurers33 by 
directly charging their patient–members a periodic subscription fee 
that covers the total cost of those patients’ primary care services, 
which cuts out insurer involvement altogether.34 Unlike other 
concierge models, direct practices employ an access subscription. 
B. The Origins of Concierge and Direct Primary Care 
Given their shared goals and notwithstanding their divergent 
business strategies, direct practices and other concierge models 
developed simultaneously. Near the turn of the millennium, a series 
of industry studies revealed that primary care doctors were 
 
predictable and, for nearly all primary care providers, a pronounced increase in their 
incomes.”). 
 30. See Pecore & Doherty, supra note 23, at 14 (describing several features of 
individualized patient care, including “comprehensive physical[s],” longer office visits, and 
easier access to the physician); James Stathopoulos, Concierge Medicine: Quality Care for a 
Price, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 155, 156 (2010) (observing that concierge 
physicians typically offer “no waiting times at office visits”).  
 31. See Carnahan, supra note 23, at 122 (canvassing various luxury services offered to 
concierge patients).  
 32. See CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., ON RETAINER: DIRECT PRIMARY CARE PRACTICES 
BYPASS INSURANCE 2 (2013) (noting that direct primary care physicians tout longer visit times 
with patients as “pivotal to reducing costs and improving outcomes”). 
 33. Lawrence P. Casalino et al., What Does It Cost Physician Practices to Interact with 
Health Insurance Plans?, 28 HEALTH AFF. 533, 538–39 (2009) (estimating that primary care 
practices spend $64,859 annually on interactions with third-party insurers, almost one-third of 
primary care physicians’ median total yearly compensation). 
 34. See Pecore & Doherty, supra note 23, at 16 (calling the direct primary care model the 
“Fee for Covered Services Model”).  
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increasingly dissatisfied with their working conditions.35 In particular, 
physicians reported that quality-of-care concerns stemming from 
shortened patient visit times were substantially driving general job 
dissatisfaction.36 Those shortened times were largely driven by lower 
government and private-insurer reimbursement rates for patient visits 
that were set to contain healthcare costs.37 For example, standard 
reimbursement rates for doctor visits in managed care programs were 
typically calculated based upon average doctor–patient visit times of 
ten minutes or less per patient.38 Physicians were driven, therefore, to 
see more patients each day to cover their overhead costs and mitigate 
their declining incomes.39 Additionally, doctors reported dedicating 
substantial portions of their workweeks to interacting with insurers,40 
further reducing their availability to their patients. Not surprisingly, 
 
 35. See, e.g., Donald E. Pathman et al., Physician Job Satisfaction, Dissatisfaction, and 
Physician Turnover, 51 J. FAM. PRAC. 593, 593 (2002) (finding that 27 percent of surveyed 
physicians reported planning to leave their practices within two years, a result largely driven by 
“dissatisfaction with pay and with relationships with communities”); Brian Vastag, Update, 
Physician Dissatisfaction Growing, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 781, 781 (2001) (reporting that 
“physicians’ job satisfaction ha[d] taken a hit in the past 15 years” and “[b]y 1997 . . . less than 
half[] [of primary care physicians] were content with the amount of time spent with patients, the 
amount of leisure time they had, and the incentives they received to provide high-quality care”).  
 36. See Mark Linzer et al., Managed Care, Time Pressure, and Physician Job Satisfaction: 
Results from the Physician Worklife Study, 15 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 441, 446–48 (2000) 
(noting that primary care “[d]octors felt time pressure in all settings . . . and acknowledged 
needing up to 41% more time than allotted to provide quality care during new patient visits” 
and that “time stress had a broad and negative impact on job satisfaction” in a study of primary 
care physician job satisfaction).  
 37. See Vicki Lawrence MacDougall, The “Shared Risk” of Potential Tort Liability of 
Health Maintenance Organizations and the Defense of ERISA Preemption, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 
855, 860–63 (1998) (discussing capitation payment plans, as plans where fixed amounts of money 
are reimbursed by insurers based on a per-patient calculated rate).  
 38. Anthony J. Linz, Paul F. Haas, L. Fleming Fallon Jr. & Richard J. Metz, Impact of 
Concierge Care on Healthcare and Clinical Practice, 105 J. AM. OSTEOPATHIC ASS’N 515, 516 
(2005).  
 39. See Jan Carter, What Makes a High-Earning Family Physician?, 12 FAM. PRAC. MGMT. 
16, 16 (2005) (reporting that pre-tax physician income decreased by $20,000 per year from 1995–
2003); Frank Pasquale, The Three Faces of Retainer Care: Crafting a Tailored Regulatory 
Response, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 39, 44–45 (2007) (“Many primary care physicians 
must see at least twenty-five to thirty patients a day in order to clear between $100,000 and 
$300,000 per year in pre-tax income.” (footnote omitted)).  
 40. Casalino et al., supra note 33, at 536–37 (reporting that primary care physicians spent 
on average three and one-half hours per work week dealing with insurers). 
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average doctor–patient appointment times had been squeezed to 
under fifteen minutes per visit by 2005.41  
Against this backdrop, concierge practices began to gain traction 
as patient-care-centered alternatives to this regime.42 At first, the 
small number of concierge practices represented a negligible 
percentage of practitioners43 and garnered limited attention from 
scholars and regulators. But these practices continued to grow in 
limited but steady numbers over the next decade.44 As this growth 
accelerated and concierge practices spread into a number of states, 
they began to draw closer scrutiny from the legal community.45  
C. Legal, Ethical, and Policy Concerns 
Since the inception of direct primary care models, scholars and 
regulators have expressed myriad legal, ethical, and policy concerns 
associated with them.46 Those concerns can be grouped into four 
 
 41. See Michael T. French et al., Is the United States Ready to Embrace Concierge 
Medicine?, 13 POPULATION HEALTH MGMT. 177, 178 (2010) (citing a CDC study indicating that 
“56.2% of physician visits lasted 15 minutes or less, and 93% were less than 30 minutes”). 
 42. For example, Howard Maron—the doctor most frequently credited with starting the 
first modern concierge practice—started MD2 in 1996 in Bellevue, Washington. Concierge 
Medicine Founder Celebrates 18 Years of Innovation, CONCIERGE MED. J. (Mar. 10, 2014), 
https://conciergemedicaljournal.com/2014/03/10/concierge-medicine-founder-celebrates-18-
years-of-innovation [https://perma.cc/S9T7-MGJ2]. Dr. Maron, who had previously worked as a 
personal physician on retainer by the Seattle Supersonics basketball franchise, claimed to have 
opened MD2 to “offer the public the same access to high-level health care enjoyed by 
professional athletes.” Joshua J. Spooner, Concierge Medicine: Origins, Growth, Controversies, 
and Implications to Medicare, 2 MEDICARE PATIENT MGMT. 26, 26 (2007). But MD2 precluded 
vast swaths of the public from enjoying its services by charging “$15,000 a year per person, and 
$25,000 per family” for its comprehensive and ultrapersonalized care. Patrice O’Shaughnessy, 
Michael Jackson’s Death Puts ‘Concierge Doctors’ in the Spotlight, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 5, 
2009, 4:27 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/michael-jackson-death-puts-
concierge-doctors-spotlight-article-1.426245 [http://perma.cc/2AE4-VTY5]. To ensure absolute 
convenience, MD2’s doctors rushed across the country to meet their patients’ needs, such as 
immunizing them on their private jets before vacations in far-flung locales. Id.  
 43. Troyen A. Brennan, Concierge Care and the Future of General Internal Medicine, 20 J. 
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1190, 1190 (2005) (estimating that there were fewer than 200 concierge 
practices in the United States as of 2005). 
 44. See, e.g., French et al., supra note 41, at 178 (estimating that as many as 5,000 concierge 
practices existed in 2008). 
 45. See generally Carnahan, supra note 23 (discussing the implications of continued future 
expansion of concierge models). 
 46. By failing to clearly distinguish the various delivery models categorized into the 
“concierge medicine” family, commentators perhaps tend to generalize the legal and policy 
concerns associated with concierge practices too broadly. Because this general classification of 
various models continues to be used in framing policy debates about direct practices, this Note 
adopts this generalization while introducing these policy concerns to the reader.  
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general categories: insurance, income discrimination, patient 
abandonment, and healthcare access. The first issue is whether 
certain types of concierge practices actually operate as health insurers 
that should be subject to insurance regulation. Direct practices and 
other concierge models include treatment in their access subscriptions 
that is normally covered by insurance in fee-for-service practices.47 
Thus, by charging prepaid fees in exchange for as-yet undefined 
numbers of appointments and treatments and by assuming that 
subscription revenues will exceed the cost of unplanned patient visits, 
practices transfer a portion of financial risk from their patients onto 
themselves.48 At least one state insurance agency has expressed 
concerns that this conduct constitutes the business of insurance.49  
Additionally, the concern about income discrimination possesses 
both legal and policy components. The legal component queries 
whether concierge models might run afoul of state healthcare-
discrimination laws. Many state statutes prohibit physicians from 
charging different rates or offering different levels of service to 
patients falling within the same health classification.50 Based on these 
statutes, at least one state health agency has warned that concierge 
practices might violate those provisions by offering services to 
premium-paying patients that would not be available to patients of 
 
 47. In contrast, “pure” concierge practices are not subject to this inquiry, because the 
access premiums they charge are for luxury services, like on-call physician access or no-wait 
appointments, not covered by insurance. Sandra J. Carnahan, Concierge Medicine: Legal and 
Ethical Issues, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 211, 211 (2007). 
 48. Carnahan, supra note 23, at 132–33. 
 49. See Portman, supra note 17, at 5 (reporting that Washington’s insurance agency 
cautioned that doctors in such practices were at risk of being criminally charged for operating as 
insurers without obtaining an insurance certification as required by Washington state law (citing 
WASH. INS. COMM’R, DRAFT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ADVISORY RE ENGAGING IN 
ACTIVITIES REQUIRING A CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION 1 (2003))).  
 50. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-04-03(7)(b) (2016). The statute defines “prohibited 
discrimination” as  
[m]aking or permitting any unfair discrimination between individuals of the same 
class and of essentially the same hazard in the amount of premium, policy fees, or 
rates charged for any policy or contract of accident or health insurance or in the 
benefits payable thereunder, or in any of the terms or conditions of such contract, or 
in any other manner whatsoever. 
Id. Similarly, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12(d) (West 2006) states: 
No person shall make or permit any unfair discrimination between individuals of the 
same class and of essentially the same hazard in the amount of premium, policy fees, 
or rates charged for any policy or contract of health insurance or in the benefits 
payable thereunder, or in any of the terms or conditions of such policy or contract, or 
in any other manner whatever.  
Id. 
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the same class who could not afford those premiums.51 The policy 
component centers on whether concierge practices will promote 
stratification in healthcare quality as they increase in number. Simply 
put, scholars worry that only those who can afford the expensive 
access premiums charged by concierge practices stand to reap the 
benefits of the concierge model.52 As a result, they suggest that the 
extra income gained from those expensive premiums, coupled with 
the prospect of a slower working pace and reduced administrative 
headaches, will drive the best doctors into concierge practices and 
away from lower-income patients.53 Scholars have also pointed out 
that discrimination concerns are not limited to income discrimination; 
one early study of concierge practices revealed that African-
American and Hispanic patients represented less than 5 percent of 
patient populations in concierge practices.54  
A third concern is patient abandonment arising from cases where 
doctors convert their practices from traditional models into concierge 
models. Like the discrimination issue, this issue contains both legal 
and ethical concerns. But the ethical aspect is more troublesome 
because primary care doctors normally do not have a legal duty to 
treat patients outside of a few narrow exceptions.55 The ethical 
concern is straightforward: What happens to the majority of a 
traditional practice’s patients who are dropped when doctors make 
the switch? In such cases, many concierge practices often reduce their 
 
 51. See N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH & SENIOR SERVS., DOBI/DHSS BULLETIN 2003-02 (Aug. 
8, 2003) (concluding that concierge practices charging access premiums violated New Jersey’s 
healthcare antidiscrimination statute and warning insurance companies not to enter into 
agreements with such practices). 
 52. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 43, at 1190 (concluding that concierge practices possess 
the “potential for distributive injustice” in medical care); Martin Donohoe, Luxury Primary 
Care, Academic Medical Centers, and the Erosion of Science and Professional Ethics, 19 J. GEN. 
INTERNAL MED. 90, 93 (2004) (suggesting that state-university-affiliated hospitals that offer 
concierge medical services “promote an overt, two-tiered system of care”). 
 53. See Brennan, supra note 43, at 1190 (suggesting that “concierge doctors do tend to 
build their practices by shipping those who cannot pay off to other doctors” and cautioning that 
the prospect of more concierge practices “would likely push more patients of color, poorer 
patients, and sicker patients into the remaining primary care practices”). 
 54. G. Caleb Alexander, Jacob Kurlander & Matthew K. Wynia, Physicians in Retainer 
(“Concierge”) Practice: A National Survey of Physician, Patient, and Practice Characteristics, 20 
J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1079, 1081 (2005). 
 55. See Carnahan, supra note 23, at 148–49 (explaining that there is generally no common 
law duty to treat absent certain narrow exceptions, such as an implied contract or “physician-
patient relationship,” when doctors only have the duty to provide adequate time for the patient 
to find a new care provider before discontinuing care). 
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total patient panels by as much as 90 percent.56 Concern has therefore 
been raised that the process of “firing” patients during the conversion 
from fee-for-service to concierge practice presents the ominous 
potential for these patients to fall through the healthcare system’s 
cracks.57 Questions have been raised about the newly converted 
concierge doctor’s ongoing responsibility to care for his former 
patients who do not, or cannot, pay the access fee.58  
Additionally, concerns have been raised about reduced 
healthcare access stemming from those patient reductions. This issue 
is perhaps the most pressing because of its potential effects on the 
American healthcare system as a whole. Scholars have pointed out 
that the improved physician working conditions offered by concierge 
models might be a double-edged sword: as concierge practices 
become more prevalent, they could produce a general practitioner 
exodus from fee-for-service practices.59 Because reduced patient-per-
physician ratios are a primary benefit of concierge practices,60 such an 
exodus would mean that fewer doctors would generally be available 
to see patients. In a fully or overstaffed primary care industry, this 
exodus would not be a problem, but a large majority of analysts agree 
that an acute and continually increasing doctor shortage is on the 
horizon.61 This shortage is largely driven by increased primary care 
 
 56. Id. at 148. 
 57. See id. at 212 (“The dark side of concierge medicine is that every physician reducing 
her patient load from 2500 to 500 leaves 2000 former patients who must find a new primary care 
physician at a time when these physicians are in increasingly short supply . . . .”). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., Maureen Glabman, Primary Care Rocked by Rough Seas, 35 PHYSICIAN 
EXEC. J. 6, 14 (2009) (asserting that concierge medicine “reduces the supply of private practice 
physicians, which is already a distressed area” (quotation marks omitted)); Jackie H. Jones & 
Linda Treiber, Concierge Medicine: The Perfect Storm? Implications for Nurse Practitioners, 6 J. 
NURSE PRAC. 109, 112 (2010). Jones and Treiber argue: 
In a time when physician shortages already exist, the exclusivity of concierge practices 
has the potential to create a “perfect storm” in medicine . . . [t]his is especially true 
when the increasing demand for health care is taken into account. As the American 
population ages . . . what is needed is greater coverage, not less. As medical advances 
increase longevity and as new knowledge and technologies emerge, the demand for 
health care will continue to increase. Concierge medicine will leave even fewer 
physicians to provide care to America’s poor and underinsured. 
Id. 
 60. For further explanation, see supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 61. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH WORKFORCE ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., PROJECTING THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR PRIMARY CARE 
PRACTITIONERS THROUGH 2020, at 2 (2013) (projecting a shortage of 20,400 primary care 
physicians by 2020); Stephen M. Petterson, Winston R. Liaw, Carol Tran & Andrew M. 
Bazemore, Estimating the Residency Expansion Required to Avoid Projected Primary Care 
CHAPPELL IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2017  2:13 PM 
2017] HEALTH CARE’S OTHER “BIG DEAL” 1343 
demand arising from two factors. The first—a disproportionate 
population increase in the 65-and-older age class—is a bigger reason 
than the second—increased patient entry into the marketplace 
because of increased insurance coverage after the ACA.62 Any 
delivery model promoting fewer patients per physician risks 
exacerbating this shortage and causing even greater stress on the 
existing provider network. Further, patients who cannot afford to 
participate in some form of concierge practice would stand to suffer 
the brunt of this physician shortage.63  
D. Pre-ACA Regulation: The 2006 West Virginia Pilot Program and 
2007 Washington Statute  
Despite the controversy surrounding concierge practices, only a 
few states regulated them before the ACA’s enactment.64 West 
Virginia and Washington pioneered regulation of the model, and both 
legally recognized only direct practices in lieu of other concierge 
forms. In 2006, West Virginia became the first.65 Vic Wood, an early 
direct care practitioner there, embarked upon a lengthy legislative 
crusade that ultimately resulted in a statute authorizing practices like 
his to continue under close agency supervision as part of a pilot 
program to explore their viability.66 But this authorization came at a 
cost. The statute imposed strict licensing and disclosure requirements, 
mandated agency approval of all advertising materials, and left all 
substantive regulation jointly in the hands of the state’s health care 
 
Physician Shortages by 2035, 13 ANNALS FAM. MED. 107, 110 (2015) (estimating primary-care-
physician shortages of 3,968 in 2020, 17,213 in 2025, 26,440 in 2030, and 33,283 in 2035).  
 62. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH WORKFORCE ANALYSIS, supra note 61, at 23–24. 
 63. Cf. Brennan, supra note 43, at 1190 (“If it were to grow in popularity, concierge 
medicine would likely push more patients of color, poorer patients, and sicker patients into the 
remaining primary care practices.”). 
 64. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.44.010(9) (2007) (recognizing direct primary care practices 
as distinct from “[h]ealth care service contractor[s]”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2J-3(a)(1) 
(LexisNexis 2006) (authorizing the implementation of direct primary care practices). 
 65. See § 16-2J-3(a)(1) (implementing West Virginia’s pilot program).  
 66. West Virginia Passes Bill to Create Preventive Care Pilot Program, AM. MED. NEWS 
(Apr. 10, 2006), http://www.amednews.com/article/20060410/business/304109991/7 
[http://perma.cc/8DE3-R3XY]. Vic Wood’s West Virginia practice was one of the first, if not the 
first, direct practices in the country that operated in the same fashion as those regulated by the 
post-ACA statutes discussed in this Note. Since 2004, Dr. Wood has offered unlimited primary 
care and x-ray diagnostics in exchange for a flat, prepaid fee pursuant to contractual agreements 
with his patients. He also recommends that his patients purchase insurance to cover health care 
beyond the scope of his agreement with them, a foreshadowing of the ACA’s approach to direct 
practices. See id.  
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authority and the insurance commissioner.67 The pilot program was to 
last through 2011,68 but it was subsequently extended through 2016.69  
Although West Virginia was the first state to regulate direct 
practices in any fashion, Washington was the first to legitimize them 
beyond the limited confines of a pilot program. This legitimization is 
not surprising given that Washington was an early testing ground for 
concierge practices.70 In fact, concierge practices were 
disproportionately concentrated in the state during the early days of 
the model’s evolution.71 In 2007, Washington’s legislature passed the 
first law that explicitly exempted direct practices from state insurance 
law.72 That law was necessary after Washington’s insurance 
commissioner published guidance concluding that concierge practices 
were subject to state law governing “health care service contractors”73 
(Washington’s statutory term for health insurers74), despite the 
commissioner’s finding in that same report that regulating them “was 
neither practical nor warranted.”75 In practical terms, this guidance 
classifies concierge practices as insurers and unleashes a torrent of 
regulatory hurdles, including extensive auditing requirements and a 
daunting “minimum net worth” threshold.76 The minimum-net-worth 
threshold creates significant barriers to market entry for small or solo 
practitioners by requiring physicians to maintain at least three million 
dollars in net assets or at least “[t]wo percent of the annual 
[insurance] premium earned . . . on the first one hundred fifty million 
dollars of premium and one percent of the annual premium on the 
premium in excess of one hundred fifty million dollars.”77  
 
 67. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2J-4–6 (LexisNexis 2015) (setting forth the regulatory and 
licensing requirements under the pilot program). 
 68. Id. § 16-2J-3(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 69. Id. § 16-2J-3(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2013). To date, the pilot program has not been renewed, 
and direct practices continue to operate in West Virginia. See, e.g., PRIMARYCAREONE, 
https://www.primarycareone.com/index.php [https://perma.cc/TX6P-Y6DC] (operating three 
direct primary care offices in West Virginia as of January 2017). 
 70. See Spooner, supra note 42, at 26 (identifying Seattle-based MD2 as the first known 
concierge practice in the United States). 
 71. H.R. 60-E2SSB 5958, Reg. Sess., at 2 (Wash. 2007). 
 72. 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 1226.  
 73. WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R, DIRECT PRACTICES: ANNUAL REPORT TO 
THE LEGISLATURE 4 (2014). 
 74. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.44.010(9) (2014). 
 75. WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R, supra note 73, at 4. 
 76. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 48.44.037, 48.44.145.  
 77. Id. § 48.44.037(1)(a)–(b). 
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In response, the statute expressly states that “retainer practices” 
are not insurers or “health care service contractors” under 
Washington insurance law.78 Although the statute uses the term 
“retainer practices,” it defines them as practices that employed 
contractual agreements and access subscriptions79—the definition of 
direct primary care.80 Thus, Washington’s “retainer practices” 
legislation was the first to legitimize and regulate direct practices 
beyond the confines of a limited pilot program. 
In addition to requiring contractual primary care, the 
Washington statute prohibits discrimination based upon “race, 
religion, national origin, the presence of any sensory, mental, or 
physical disability, education, economic status, or sexual 
orientation,”81 and it forbids direct practices from refusing to accept 
new patients based solely on their “health status.”82 It also limits the 
circumstances under which physicians can terminate existing patients 
to cases when the patient fails to pay the access subscription, commits 
fraud, refuses to follow the doctor’s prescribed “treatment plan,” or 
acts in an abusive manner presenting “an emotional or physical 
danger to the [practice’s] staff or other patients.”83 Finally, the statute 
allows practices to terminate patient agreements if they cease 
operating under the direct primary care model.84 Regardless of the 
reason for termination, the statute requires direct practices to provide 
sufficient “notice and opportunity to obtain care from another 
physician” before ending any patient relationship.85 
Among other requirements—such as prohibiting fraud or 
misrepresentation with respect to the direct primary agreements—the 
statute mandates that physicians charge the access subscriptions on a 
monthly basis.86 Additionally, the statute requires every direct care 
agreement to provide a disclaimer stating that the agreement does not 
constitute comprehensive health insurance and that the scope of the 
agreement is limited to the delivery services specifically named in the 
 
 78. Id. § 48.150.060. 
 79. Id. § 48.150.010(1)–(4). 
 80. For a detailed explanation of the distinction between direct primary care and other 
concierge models, see supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
 81. WASH. REV. CODE. § 48.150.020. 
 82. Id. § 48.150.050(1). 
 83. Id. § 48.150.050(2). 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. § 48.150.030(1). 
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agreement.87 Finally, the statute requires direct practices to submit an 
annual report to the Washington Office of the Insurance 
Commissioner disclosing “the number of providers in each practice, 
[the] total number of patients being served, the average direct fee 
being charged,” and the name of each participating physician.88 
In sum, West Virginia and Washington pioneered regulation of 
direct practices. In particular, Washington set forth a number of 
important provisions governing the conduct of such practices that 
would later serve as models for post-ACA state legislation.89 
E. The Turning Point: The ACA and Direct Primary Care 
The ACA swept broadly and deeply,90 and direct primary care 
did not elude its reach. Yet proponents of the model should hardly 
complain; the ACA’s approach to direct practices, though 
understated, can only be positive for the model’s long-term growth.  
Before the ACA, the federal government largely refused to wade 
into the concierge-care debate. The Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) treaded lightly by simply warning “pure” 
concierge practices participating in Medicare against billing twice for 
covered services.91 HHS’s guidance concluded that double billing 
would not occur when practices charged premiums for services that 
were not covered by Medicare (such as luxury services like all-hours 
physician access and accoutrements like robes and slippers). But it 
said that double billing would occur if practices charged premiums for 
simply allowing access to physicians.92 
 
 87. Id. § 48.150.110(2). 
 88. Id. § 48.150.100(1). 
 89. For further discussion, see infra Part II. 
 90. See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2013) (describing the ACA as “a 
sweeping legislative and regulatory overhaul of the nation’s health-care system”), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 2903 (2014). 
 91. The Department of Health and Human Services published a report, OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A ROADMAP FOR NEW 
PHYSICIANS: AVOIDING MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE 14 (2015), stating: 
You may see advertisements offering to help you convert your practice into a 
“boutique,” “concierge,” or “retainer” practice . . . . If you are a [Medicare] 
participating or non-participating physician, you may not ask Medicare patients to 
pay a second time for services for which Medicare has already paid. It is legal to 
charge patients for services that are not covered by Medicare. However, charging an 
“access fee” or “administrative fee” that simply allows them to obtain Medicare-
covered services from your practice constitutes double billing. 
Id. (emphasis added).  
 92. Id. To clarify, this practice would constitute double billing because doctors would bill 
Medicare for covered services at the government’s preestablished reimbursement rate and 
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The federal government’s silence on direct practices ended, 
albeit tacitly, with the passage of the ACA. Within that legislation, a 
largely unnoticed provision93 both recognized direct practices and 
drew them into the ACA’s coverage offerings. The provision 
appeared in the section defining “qualified health plans,” meaning 
plans that meet all of the legal requirements necessary to be offered 
on the state healthcare exchanges created by the ACA.94 The passage 
says:  
The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall permit a 
qualified health plan to provide coverage through a qualified direct 
primary care medical home plan that meets criteria established by 
the Secretary, so long as the qualified health plan meets all 
requirements that are otherwise applicable and the services covered 
by the medical home plan are coordinated with the entity offering 
the qualified health plan.95 
Shortly after the ACA’s passage, HHS further defined “direct 
primary care medical home plans” as plans that “include an 
arrangement where a fee is paid by an individual, or on behalf of an 
individual, directly to a medical home for primary care services.”96  
There is scant legislative history to provide insight into 
Congress’s motives behind adding this provision to the ACA. 
 
would then bill patients for the same services, a violation of the False Claims Act. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320a-7a(a)(1)(B) (2012) (prohibiting “fraudulent” claims for medical services). 
 93. As of February 2017, only one law review article referenced this provision, and that 
article only referenced the relevant language in a footnote with no further discussion. See 
Hammond, supra note 14, at 318 n.52 (discussing the relevant language in § 10104(a)(3) of the 
ACA in a footnote).  
 94. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 18021 (defining requirements for plans on state exchanges). 
 95. Id. § 18021(a)(3). 
 96. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and 
Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,866, 41,900 (proposed July 15, 2011) (to be codified at 
45 C.F.R. § 156.245). The term “medical home” is used throughout the ACA, and the ACA 
leaves the task of specifically defining what constitutes “medical homes” to HHS. 42 U.S.C. § 
18021(a)(3). However, the term is widely recognized in the medical field to define a broad 
spectrum of best-practice-driven primary care delivery models consistent with direct practices. 
See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, THE MEDICAL HOME MODEL OF 
CARE (2012), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/the-medical-home-model-of-care.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/9G5G-WWPU] (providing an overview medical-home regulation). Analyzing 
the precise contours of what constitutes a “medical home” is not necessary here because HHS’s 
proposed rule defining “direct primary care medical homes” simply proposes to define them as 
“consistent with the program established in Washington.” Establishment of Exchanges and 
Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,900. Therefore, the definition of “medical home” 
under federal law would not add any additional qualifications or legal requirements to direct 
practices if HHS’s proposed rule is adopted.  
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However, HHS’s interpretive guidance and commentary 
accompanying its 2011 proposed rule implementing the provision97 
shed considerable light on the contemporary reasoning behind it, by 
saying: 
Commenters . . . noted that the direct primary care medical home 
model in the State of Washington has benefited providers by 
providing predictable income without added administrative costs, 
while consumers gain access to an affordable and reliable source of 
primary services that decreases reliance on emergency rooms as a 
source of routine care.98  
So one can infer that federal policymakers concluded that the 
demonstrated benefits of direct practices sufficiently outweighed their 
potential drawbacks. 
That provision’s practical impact allows for qualified health plans 
offered on state insurance exchanges to provide all of their patients’ 
primary care needs through direct practices without separate 
insurance coverage for primary care.99 But for qualified health plans 
to offer  
plans including direct practice agreements, they must also provide 
“catastrophic” coverage for medical care beyond the scope of  
primary care, such as emergency care, specialist treatment, or 
surgery.100 Put differently, direct practice arrangements may be 
offered in combination with “wrap-around” insurance coverage—that 
is, insurance that covers “catastrophic” care.101 They may not be 
offered as standalone health plans without such wrap-around 
coverage.102  
 
 97. Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,900.  
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. (allowing direct primary care packages to be offered as part of “qualified health 
plans” on the exchanges). 
 100. Catastrophic Health Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/catastrophic-health-plan [http://perma.cc/2SGK-EZ52]. 
 101. Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,900. 
 102. Interestingly, HHS indicated that it had indeed considered allowing direct practices to 
independently market themselves on state exchanges, but it ultimately decided otherwise: 
We considered allowing an individual to purchase a direct primary care medical home 
plan and separately acquire wrap-around coverage. However, direct primary care 
medical homes are providers, not insurance companies, which would require the 
Exchange to develop an accreditation and certification process that is inherently 
different from certifying health plans and that would significantly depart from the 
role of an Exchange. Furthermore, allowing a separate offering would require 
consumers to make two payments for full medical coverage, adding complexity to the 
process of acquiring health insurance, ensuring enrollees have access to the full 
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This provision’s scope is limited because it only affects direct 
practice agreements offered on the state, and federally run insurance 
exchanges, which comprise only a small percentage of America’s 
insured population.103 Yet its most important impact may be that it 
finally marked an unmistakable federal affirmation of the model as a 
legal and desirable form of healthcare delivery. Thus, although its 
direct reach might be limited to a small percentage of patients, the 
ACA’s clear recognition of direct primary care has perhaps 
emboldened states to promote that model’s advancement.  
F. Riding the Wave: Post-ACA State Regulation of Direct Primary 
Care 
Perhaps owing in part to the ACA’s qualified endorsement of 
direct practices, the direct primary care movement has gained 
newfound momentum with the passage of twelve new statutes 
exempting them from state insurance regulation. Oregon was the first 
to act in 2011.104 Utah followed in 2012,105 followed by Arizona106 and 
Louisiana in 2014.107 The movement saw its greatest gains, however, 
in 2015 when eight states passed direct primary care legislation.108 In 
 
complement of the essential health benefits to which they are entitled, and 
complicating the allocation of advance payments of the premium tax credit.  
Id. 
 103. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UPDATED ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF THE 
INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, APRIL 2014, at 5–6 
(2014) (estimating nationwide participation in ACA-created health insurance exchanges to be 
just over 6 million people in 2014 and to rise to 25 million after 2017—still well under 10 percent 
of the current estimated American population). 
 104. Act of June 23, 2011, 2011 Or. Laws 499 (codified in OR. REV. STAT. §§ 735.500−510 
(2015)).  
 105. Act of Mar. 15, 2012, 2012 Utah Laws 50 (codified in UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-4-
106(2), 31A-4-106.5 (LexisNexis 2015)). 
 106. Act of Apr. 23, 2014, 2014 Ariz. Sess. Laws 161 (codified in ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 20-123, 44-1799.91−92 (2014)). 
 107. Act of Aug. 1, 2014, 2014 La. Acts 867 (codified in LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1360.81−91 
(2015)). 
 108. An Act to Exempt a Concierge Service Arrangement from the Insurance Laws of 
Arkansas; and for Other Purposes, 2015 Ark. Acts 101 (codified in ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-60-
104, 23-76-103(c) (2015)); Idaho Direct Medical Care Act, 2015 Idaho Sess. Laws 291 (codified 
in IDAHO CODE §§ 39-9201 to -9209 (2015)); Act of May 7, 2015, Ch. 46, § 1, 2015 Kan. Sess. 
Laws 613 (codified in KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4978 (2015)); Act of Jan. 10, 2015, 2015 Mich. Pub. 
Acts 522 (codified in MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.129 (2015)); Mississippi Direct Primary Care 
Act, 2015 Miss. Laws 369 (codified in MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 83-81-1 to -11 (2015)); Act of July 2, 
2015, 2015 Mo. Legis. Serv. 425 (West) (codified in MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1800 (2015)); Health 
Care Empowerment Act, 2015 Okla. Sess. Laws 159 (codified in OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 
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addition, several national advocacy groups have emerged to 
encourage further state legislation.109 
G. Future State Legislation 
In addition to the fourteen states that have passed direct care 
legislation, Florida legislators introduced a similar bill in 2015.110 The 
bill was passed with overwhelming bipartisan support in the Florida 
House of Representatives111 but was not voted on in the Senate.112 As 
of this writing, the author is aware of no other pending state 
legislation in 2016 but, based upon the wave of 2015 statutes, future 
state initiatives seem almost certain. 
H. Proposed Federal Legislation 
Despite the various state efforts and the ACA’s approval of 
direct practices in state insurance exchanges, one legal hurdle to even 
greater expansion of the model persists at the federal level. Despite 
HHS’s ACA-driven support, the IRS potentially maintains an 
“agency split” with its position on the tax status of direct practices. 
Current IRS guidelines consider direct care agreements as “health 
plans,” rather than qualified medical expenditures under § 213(d) of 
the tax code.113 This position effectively prevents people with health 
savings accounts (HSAs)114 from engaging with direct practices 
 
4604−4605 (2015)); Act of May 28, 2015, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 1214 (codified in TEX. OCC. 
CODE §§ 162.251−256 (2015)). 
 109. One such group, the Direct Primary Care Coalition (DPCC), has been particularly 
influential in advocating further legitimization of these practices, and that organization’s “model 
bill” shares many of the same provisions and characteristics with many of the state statutes 
passed thus far. Model State Legislation: Direct Primary Care Agreements, DIRECT PRIMARY 
CARE COAL. (2014), http://www.dpcare.org/#!dpcc-model-legislation/c14ob 
[http://perma.cc/MR6W-QPUZ]. 
 110. See generally H.B. 7047, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015) (exempting direct primary care 
agreements from insurance regulation). 
 111. H.B. 25A, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015). H.B. 25A passed by a vote of ninety-nine to one. 
HB 25-A: Direct Primary Care, FLA. SENATE, http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2015A/25A 
[https://perma.cc/5RFP-ZAX3]. 
 112. See FLA. SENATE, supra note 111 (stating that S. 7047 died in committee).  
 113. See IRS, PUBLICATION 502: MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES 6, 12−14 (2014) 
(excluding direct primary care fees from a list of qualified “medical and dental expenses” that 
can be paid by HSA funds). 
 114. HSAs are tax-exempt accounts where participants deposit preset monthly amounts to 
save for healthcare expenses. These accounts are required to be coupled with high-deductible 
(“catastrophic”) insurance plans. The deposited funds generally can only be withdrawn for 
healthcare spending. However, they are beneficial for patients who do not have significant 
health expenses because the monthly deposit and accompanying catastrophic coverage 
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because the tax code prohibits HSA holders from supplementing 
their catastrophic insurance plans with a second “health plan.”115 
Until the IRS revises its position, HSA-holding patients wishing to 
join direct practices do so at the peril of exposing themselves to both 
liability for the funds in their HSAs and additional tax penalties.116  
In response, a bipartisan group of senators proposed the Direct 
Primary Care Enhancement Act of 2015.117 This legislation would 
both clarify that direct practices are not “health plans” under the tax 
code and allow HSA participants to use their healthcare funds to pay 
for direct primary care access subscriptions.118 The bill never reached 
the voting floor.  
Although the 114th Congress did not vote on the Direct Primary 
Care Enhancement Act, the model continues to garner attention from 
federal lawmakers. In fact, direct primary care could play an 
important role in Republican efforts to replace or amend the ACA. 
The House’s 2016 ACA-replacement plan included a provision that 
would allow direct primary care subscription fees to be paid from 
HSA funds.119 Indeed, Tom Price, the current Secretary of HHS, 
included provisions in his 2016 ACA-replacement bill that would 
amend the Internal Revenue Code to exempt direct primary care 
from its definition of “insurance” and define access subscriptions as 
“medical care.”120 Congress, therefore, appears poised to further 
 
premiums are considerably cheaper than the monthly premiums charged by health plans with 
lower deductibles and because participants can deduct their deposits made from their taxable 
income. See Health Savings Accounts: Is an HSA Right for You?, MAYO CLINIC (Apr. 8, 2013), 
http://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/consumer-health/in-depth/health-savings-
accounts/art-20044058 [https://perma.cc/XB64-XTAW] (providing an overview of HSAs). 
 115. See I.R.C. § 223(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (defining eligible HSA holders as individuals who 
are “not, while covered under a high deductible health plan, covered under any [other] plan”). 
 116. See id. §§ 223(b)(8)(B)(i)(I)–(II) (imposing tax liability for all contributions made to 
HSAs and mandating a 10 percent tax penalty upon HSA holders who become ineligible). 
 117. Primary Care Enhancement Act of 2015, S. 1989, 114th Cong. The House proposed its 
own version of the bill in 2016. Primary Care Enhancement Act of 2016, H.R. 6015, 114th Cong. 
That bill was not voted on either.  
 118. See id. §§ 2–3 (clarifying that direct practices are not “health plan[s]” and classifying 
access subscriptions as “medical care”).  
 119. Joseph Antos & James Capretta, The House Republicans’ Health Plan, HEALTH AFF.: 
BLOG (June 22, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/06/22/the-house-republicans-health-
plan [https://perma.cc/W7S3-9VUJ]. 
 120. See Empowering Patients First Act of 2015 §§ 127, 128, H.R. 2300, 114th Cong. 
(exempting direct practices from the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of “insurance” and 
defining “medical care” to “include periodic fees paid to a primary care physician for the right 
to receive medical services on an as-needed basis”). 
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expand direct primary care access to a considerable portion of the 
insured population.121  
II.  THE STATUTES: SUBSTANTIVE COMPARISON AND SUMMARY 
Each of the state statutes passed since 2007 seeks to legitimize 
and regulate direct primary care practices. However, the statutes vary 
across jurisdictions, and no two are identical. This Part summarizes 
and compares the statutes by examining their key provisions.122 This 
Part concludes by suggesting which provisions should be included in 
future legislation to most effectively address the policy concerns 
discussed above.  
A. Shared Provisions: Insurance Exemption and “In Writing” 
Requirement 
The statutes share several uniform provisions. First, all state that 
direct practices are not insurers and exempt them from state 
insurance regulation.123 This uniform exemption comes as no surprise 
given that these practices’ insurance status is critical to their 
continued viability and growth.124 These provisions are also essential 
to the model’s continued growth, as cumbersome certification criteria 
like minimum net-worth requirements can preclude most physicians 
from operating direct practices.125 Second, all of the statutes require 
the doctor–patient agreements establishing access subscriptions to be 
in writing and to set forth the terms and scope of the services 
 
 121. See AHIP CTR. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, 2015 CENSUS OF HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNT 
- HIGH DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH PLANS 4 (2015) (estimating that 19.7 million Americans 
participate in HSAs as of January 2015). 
 122. This analysis does not include the West Virginia statute because that statute delegates 
all legislative authority governing provider conduct to two state agencies, so it contains a scant 
amount of relevant substantive law. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2J-6 (LexisNexis 2013).  
 123. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:1360.86 (2014) (“A direct practice that complies with the 
provisions of this Part is not a health insurance insurer and not subject to the provisions of nor 
the regulations under [Louisiana insurance law].”). 
 124. See, e.g., WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R, supra note 73, at 4 (explaining 
the Washington Commissioner’s position that providers offering direct patient practices should 
not be subject to the full scope of state insurance regulations). 
 125. See Carnahan, supra note 23, at 133. Carnahan notes:  
As a practical matter, concierge physicians deemed to be [insurers] likely would be 
unable to meet eligibility criteria for a certificate of registration, which includes, 
among many onerous requirements, that they provide documentation of an initial net 
worth of one million dollars, and thereafter maintain a minimum net worth equal to 
three million dollars. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
CHAPPELL IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2017  2:13 PM 
2017] HEALTH CARE’S OTHER “BIG DEAL” 1353 
offered.126 These provisions ensure that participating parties will have 
adequate notice of the terms and conditions of the agreement and the 
scope of the healthcare services offered. 
B. The Prohibition Against Billing Insurers 
All but Missouri and Arkansas explicitly prohibit direct practices 
from billing insurers for any healthcare services provided.127 Idaho 
and Kansas go further by also prohibiting patients from billing 
insurance.128 These provisions seem superfluous given that reduced 
overhead from excluding insurers is a key benefit of the direct 
practice model; providers would presumably avoid insurer 
involvement on their own for economic reasons.129 Although there is 
no legislative history to shed more light on the various state 
legislatures’ thinking with respect to these provisions, it is possible 
that those legislatures sought to protect direct practices from 
potential conflicts with federal insurance laws—such as double-billing 
prohibitions130—by removing insurance transactions from the picture 
entirely. Regulatory flexibility might be another consideration at play: 
by statutorily recognizing only cash-only practices, which comprise a 
narrow subset of the concierge-medicine family, the states have taken 
no position on “luxury” practices that bill insurers for healthcare 
services and patients for uncovered amenities.  
C. Agreement Terms and Disclaimer Requirements  
Ten states require the inclusion of specific terms in subscription 
agreements.131 Typical provisions include the medical services 
included in the agreement, the amount of the access subscription fee, 
 
 126. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-9203(2) (2015) (“‘Direct primary care agreement’ means a 
written contract between a primary care provider and an individual patient or a patient’s 
representative in which the primary care provider agrees to provide direct primary care services 
to the patient over a specified period of time for payment of a direct fee.”). 
 127. For a detailed comparison of the statutes’ billing prohibitions, see infra App. 
 128. For a detailed comparison of the statutes’ billing prohibitions, see infra App. 
 129. For explanation on how insurer involvement increases costs and shortens doctor–
patient visit times, see supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
 130. For further discussion of potential conflicts with federal insurance laws, see supra notes 
91–92 and accompanying text. 
 131. For a detailed comparison of the statutes’ requirements with respect to the content of 
written agreements, see infra App. 
CHAPPELL IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2017  2:13 PM 
1354  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1331 
the payment interval, and the conditions and circumstances governing 
termination of the agreement.132  
With the exception of Oklahoma, all ten states also require a 
“disclaimer” provision stating that the agreements do not constitute 
insurance.133 Others require additional language, such as a statement 
that “the agreement standing alone does not satisfy the health benefit 
requirements as established in the federal Affordable Care Act” and 
that failure to acquire additional insurance may expose the patient to 
ACA-mandated penalties for failing to meet minimum-coverage 
standards.134 A representative provision from Louisiana reads as 
follows: “This agreement does not provide comprehensive health 
insurance coverage. It provides only the health care services 
specifically described.”135 These disclosure requirements ensure that 
patients are both fully apprised of the services they will receive and 
aware of their responsibility to obtain insurance to cover services 
beyond the scope of the agreed services. 
D. Termination Requirements 
All but three states require that concierge services allow patients 
to terminate access subscriptions at will, provided that they give 
written notification.136 However, the statutes diverge with respect to 
the conditions under which physicians are allowed to unilaterally 
terminate them. Ten of the thirteen states explicitly allow physicians 
to terminate agreements at will, allow them to specify cancellation 
terms of their choosing in the agreement, or do not speak to the issue 
at all, which implies that at-will termination is lawful.137 These statutes 
 
 132. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-9204(1) (2015) (describing the required “[d]irect primary 
care agreement provisions”).  
 133. Compare id. (describing the required “[d]irect primary care agreement provisions”), 
with OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 4604−4605 (2015) (failing to specify the contents of direct primary 
care agreements).  
 134. MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-81-9(g)(ii)–(iii) (2015). 
 135. LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:1360.89(A)(1) (2014). 
 136. For a detailed comparison of the statutes’ termination requirements, see Appendix, 
http://dlj.law.duke.edu/chappell-appendix [https://perma.cc/N2HA-YX2S]. See also ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 44-1799.92(C) (2015) (“An enrollee may cancel a direct primary care provider 
plan for any reason on written notice to the plan.”). Arizona places no limits on when 
agreements can be terminated but mandates that agreements “must include cancellation terms 
for relocation and military duty.” See id.  
 137. For a comparison of the statutes, see Appendix. See also, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 376.1800(4)(3) (2015) (allowing “either party to terminate the agreement on written notice to 
the other party”). 
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can be classified together because their practical effect is the same: 
the physician shares equal discretion with the patient to terminate the 
subscription.  
Three statutes set forth limited circumstances under which 
doctors can terminate agreements.138 All three allow physician 
termination when the patient fails to pay the access subscription, 
refuses to follow the doctor’s prescribed treatment plan, acts in an 
abusive manner, or threatens physical violence; they also allow 
termination when the physician discontinues practice under the direct 
care model.139 Two also allow physicians to terminate an agreement if 
the patient commits fraud.140 Mississippi alone adds a sixth condition, 
allowing for physician termination when the “physician feels that the 
relationship is no longer therapeutic for the patient due to a 
dysfunctional physician/patient relationship.”141 Only three statutes, 
in near-identical language, explicitly require that adequate notice be 
given to the patient in the event that a doctor terminates a 
subscription.142  
E. Prohibition Against Discrimination 
Three statutes—Louisiana, Oregon, and Washington—prohibit 
direct practices from refusing to accept patients on the basis of race, 
religion, or mental or physical disability.143 Oregon additionally 
prohibits discrimination based on “race, religion, gender, sexual 
identity, sexual preference or health status,”144 and Washington 
prohibits discrimination based on “race, religion, national origin, the 
presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, education, 
 
 138. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:1360.85(A)(1)–(5) (2014) (setting forth specific circumstances 
where physician termination is acceptable); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-81-11(a)–(f) (2015) (same); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.150.050(1) (2009) (same).  
 139. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:1360.85(A)(1)–(5) (setting forth specific circumstances 
where physician termination is acceptable).  
 140. See id. § 37:1360.85(A)(2) (permitting a physician to discontinue care if a patient 
commits fraud); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-81-11(b) (same). 
 141. MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-81-11(f). 
 142. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:1360.85(A) (requiring notice to a patient upon termination of 
a subscription); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-81-11 (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.150.050(1) (2014) 
(same). 
 143. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:1360.82 (2014) (precluding direct practices from declining 
patients on the basis of race, religion, or mental or physical disability, among others); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 735.500(3)(g) (2011) (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.150.020 (same).  
 144. OR. REV. STAT. § 735.500(3)(g). 
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economic status, or sexual orientation.”145 Arizona, despite failing to 
include these protections, prohibits price discrimination by 
proscribing direct primary care physicians from charging different 
prices to patients on the basis of gender or a preexisting medical 
condition.146 Mississippi’s statute includes nothing about price 
discrimination or the traditional grounds of discrimination included in 
the Louisiana, Oregon, and Washington statutes, but it prohibits 
refusing to accept patients on the basis of preexisting conditions.147 
However, the remainder of the statutes fails to include any language 
barring discrimination.  
The failure of many states to include antidiscrimination language 
is perhaps influenced by redundancy concerns, as numerous general 
antidiscrimination statutes independently govern physician conduct. 
For example, the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits any entity 
receiving federal funding from discriminating “on the [basis] of race, 
color, or national origin.”148 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 similarly 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by federal-funding 
recipients.149 Physicians participating in Medicare or Medicaid would 
thus be subject to these prohibitions. Additionally, many states have 
their own general antidiscrimination statutes that apply to all 
businesses150 or at least to “places of public accommodation,” which, 
depending on their statutory definitions, often include doctors’ 
offices.151 State legislators might have therefore felt that including 
 
 145. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.150.020.  
 146. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1799.92(C) (2010) (“A direct primary care provider 
plan may not charge different fees for comparable services based on an enrollee’s health status 
or sex.”).  
 147. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-81-11 (“[D]irect primary care [practices] may not decline to 
accept new . . . patients or discontinue care to existing patients solely because of the patient’s 
health status.”). 
 148. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).  
 149. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012). 
 150. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-3 (LexisNexis 2015) (“All persons within the 
jurisdiction of this state . . . are entitled to full . . . goods and services in all business 
establishments . . . without discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry or 
national origin.”). 
 151. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002 (2012) (defining “[p]ublic accommodations” as 
“any person who . . . offers goods, services, facilities and accommodations to the public”); see 
also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1442(A) (2010) (declaring “[d]iscrimination in places of public 
accommodation against any person because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or 
ancestry” to be “unlawful”); § 41-1441(2) (defining “[p]laces of public accommodation” as, 
among other things, “all public places which are conducted . . . for the benefit, use or 
accommodation of those seeking health”).  
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additional antidiscrimination provisions in direct primary care 
statutes would simply be superfluous.  
But Mississippi and Texas have a potential loophole unique to 
direct practices with regard to suspect-class discrimination. The 
federal antidiscrimination provisions bind only physicians 
participating in Medicare and Medicaid or otherwise receiving federal 
funds. Because direct practices in those states cannot bill any insurers 
for their services152—and thus do not receive federal funding—they 
are beyond the reach of those antidiscrimination provisions. Further, 
neither Mississippi nor Texas have enacted general “public 
accommodation” or physician-specific antidiscrimination laws. 
Therefore, unlike in traditional contexts—in which federal law covers 
patients even without state protections—direct practices’ statutory 
exemption from Medicare and Medicaid also exempts them from 
federal laws, potentially leaving patients unprotected.  
F. Agency Oversight and Enforcement 
Oregon, Louisiana, and Washington include specific enforcement 
mechanisms in their statutes. Oregon’s statute requires each direct 
practice to be certified by the state’s Department of Consumer and 
Business Services.153 Although the initial certification requirements 
are minimal,154 the statute vests the department with the authority to 
investigate direct practices’ statutory compliance and the discretion to 
suspend or revoke violators’ licenses.155 Louisiana’s statute confers 
auditing and enforcement authority to its physician-licensing board 
and authorizes the board to punish violators by sanctioning them for 
“unprofessional conduct.”156 Potential sanctions include suspension or 
revocation of a physician’s license as well as “probationary or other 
restrictions” as necessary.157 Washington similarly categorizes 
violations of its regulations as “unprofessional conduct” under its 
 
 152. MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-81-3(c) (2015); TEX. OCC. CODE § 162.254 (2015). 
 153. OR. REV. STAT. § 735.500(2) (2011). 
 154. See id. (requiring only that direct practices are not “controlled” by insurers and that 
they were never certified to “transact insurance”). 
 155. See id. § 735.500(5) (describing the conditions under which the department may revoke 
a direct practice’s certification). 
 156. LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:1360.91 (2014).  
 157. Id. § 37:1285(A)(13) (2015).  
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physician-licensing laws,158 subjecting violators to a variety of 
potential penalties that includes license revocation.159  
In contrast, none of the other state statutes contain enforcement 
mechanisms or specific penalties for noncompliance. Nor do they 
contain explicit private rights of action. Presumably, practices found 
in violation of those statutes would not qualify as direct practices 
under state law, meaning they would not be exempted from 
prohibitive insurance regulations.160 Perhaps the prospect of onerous 
insurance regulation is itself a suitable enforcement mechanism,161 but 
the question of who has auditing and enforcement authority 
remains.162  
G. Suggestions for Future State Legislation 
In addition to the basic patient protections and provider 
requirements set forth in most of the already-enacted statutes, states 
crafting future legislation should improve two primary shortcomings 
found in a number of the statutes already in force. First, they should 
prohibit discrimination that is not already illegal under other laws. 
Second, they should clarify their oversight and enforcement 
mechanisms.  
When other general antidiscrimination laws do not apply—such 
as in states that do not have general antidiscrimination laws or that do 
not include doctors’ offices in their statutory definitions of “places of 
public accommodation”—future statutes should prohibit suspect-class 
discrimination. Doing so would preclude the creation of loopholes, 
like those found in Mississippi and Texas, that result from statutory 
preclusion of Medicare and Medicaid participation.163 There is no 
reason to deny direct primary care patients these protections when 
 
 158. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.150.090 (2007). 
 159. See id. § 18.130.160 (2010) (listing potential penalties).  
 160. Cf. MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-81-9 (2015) (“In order to be considered a direct primary care 
agreement for the purposes of this section, the direct primary care agreement must meet all of 
the following requirements . . . .”). 
 161. For an explanation of how insurance regulation can cripple or destroy direct practices, 
see supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 162. Although direct primary care physicians, like other physicians, are subject to the 
various statutory provisions and administrative regulations enforced by the physician-licensing 
boards in their respective states, those general physician regulations may not require the same 
conduct prohibited or required by the direct primary care statutes, such as including the specific 
language in direct care agreements or not billing insurers.  
 163. For a discussion of how and why Mississippi and Texas preclude direct practices from 
billing Medicare and Medicaid, see supra note 152 and accompanying text.  
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nearly all other patients already receive them. More importantly, a 
wealth of recent academic research suggests that racial and ethnic 
minorities continue to receive lower quality health care in the United 
States.164 It is true that many factors other than illicit bias and the 
quality of primary care certainly contribute to these disparities.165 But 
at the very least, states can combat overt discrimination and reduce its 
contribution to those disparities by including antidiscrimination 
provisions in direct primary care legislation. 
Second, future state statutes should clarify their enforcement and 
oversight mechanisms. Some states might conclude that minimal 
enforcement and oversight of direct practices are desirable while 
others might conclude that greater regulatory intervention is 
necessary. There are numerous ways to implement either conclusion. 
For example, they can tie penalties to direct practice licenses, like 
Oregon does,166 or they can mirror Louisiana and Washington by 
simply conferring the same penalties on direct primary care providers 
who violate their statutes as they confer on other physicians who 
commit “unprofessional conduct.”167 Indeed, they could even create a 
private right of action to allow aggrieved patients to sue for 
vindication of their legal rights, although no one has done so yet. 
Similarly, states have many oversight options from which to choose. 
Although state physician-licensing boards might be the most obvious 
oversight authorities, states might also choose to confer oversight on 
their insurance-enforcement departments. Or they can choose not to 
oversee direct practices at all, perhaps leaving vindication of patients’ 
legal rights exclusively to civil litigation. This Note does not 
recommend a particular mechanism or attempt to find the 
appropriate regulatory balance, but it does recommend clarity. 
Regardless of the regulatory reach they intend to create, states should 
expressly circumscribe the scope and practical operation of their 
statutory requirements. 
 
 164. See generally, e.g., David R. Williams & Ronald Wyatt, Opinion, Racial Bias in Health 
Care and Health Challenges and Opportunities, 314 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 555 (2015) (discussing 
various studies on health disparities and the reasons for racial bias in health care). 
 165. See, e.g., THOMAS A. LAVEIST, MINORITY POPULATIONS AND HEALTH: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 133–202 (2005) (canvassing 
various theories advanced to explain the causes of health disparities among minorities). 
 166. OR. REV. STAT. § 735.500(5) (2011). 
 167. LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:1360.91 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.150.090 (2007). 
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III.  FACING OLD DEMONS: HOW DIRECT PRIMARY CARE STATUTES 
ENGAGE LONGSTANDING POLICY CONCERNS 
Any policy evaluation of these statutes must begin by revisiting 
the longstanding policy concerns that concierge practices have 
presented since their inception—namely, their status under insurance 
law, income discrimination, patient abandonment, and healthcare 
access.168 Canvassing the statutes reveals that the results are mixed: all 
of the statutes engage some of those concerns, some statutes address 
others, and none address them all. But these considerations are not 
the end of the matter. The larger questions are how these statutes 
interact with the current, post-ACA healthcare framework and how 
that interaction will change as the number of direct practices 
continues to grow. This Part examines the policy problems discussed 
above.  
A. Insurance 
Since their inception, the insurance status of direct practices has 
been critical to their continued viability.169 However, extensive 
discussion of this matter is no longer necessary. The states that have 
passed direct primary care statutes have explicitly settled this legal 
question in the negative—direct practices are not insurers under state 
law. This relatively simple determination can pave the way for future 
growth of the use of this model. The final unresolved question in this 
area is whether Congress will follow suit and open the model to new 
audiences by defining subscription fees as “health expenses” rather 
than “health plans,” which would allow HSA holders to pay for access 
subscriptions with their tax-deductible healthcare funds.170 
Regardless, the state statutes’ exemption of direct practices from state 
insurance regulation likely ensures that the model is here to stay.  
B. Income Discrimination and Quality-of-Care Disparities 
Aside from the two statutes that prohibit patient refusal on the 
basis of income and the one that prohibits health-based price 
 
 168. For a detailed discussion of the policy concerns surrounding direct practices, see supra 
Part I.C. 
 169. For further discussion on how the insurance status of direct practices can impact their 
viability, see supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text. 
 170. For an explanation of how current law prohibits HSA participants from using their 
funds to pay for direct practice expenses, see supra Part I.H. 
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discrimination,171 the statutes are silent on the matter of economic 
disparity. For example, nothing in the statutes prohibits operation of 
an “elite” direct practice that charges exorbitant access subscriptions 
to those with the means to pay for ultrapersonalized care and 
heightened access.172  
Nevertheless, market forces driving the model’s growth might 
largely address this longstanding concern. The statutory silence on 
this issue only preserves the status quo. Even critics of concierge 
practices who fear their widespread promulgation have noted that the 
high-end concierge model is likely self-limiting.173 The idea is simple: 
if only the wealthy few can afford expensive access premiums, 
demand growth is necessarily limited.174 Indeed, some have expressed 
relief at the observation that high-end practices have not become 
commonplace.175 It stands to reason that widespread quality-of-care 
disparities stemming from higher-end concierge practices remains of 
little concern at this point. Instead, the growth of concierge models in 
general necessarily depends on their accessibility to a much larger 
population than the one targeted by luxury practices. 
Perhaps, for this reason, the majority of direct practices 
promoted by these statutes have been structured to reach a less 
affluent customer base. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the recent 
increase in concierge practices has been driven by “blue collar” 
practices.176 Blue-collar practices charge more affordable monthly 
subscription fees in exchange for conventional primary care services 
 
 171. For a discussion of how the various statutes address (or fail to address) price 
discrimination, see supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.  
 172. See Elizabeth Ody, Wealthy Families Skip Waiting Rooms with Concierge Medical 
Plans, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 16, 2012, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-03-16/wealthy-families-skip-waiting-rooms-with-
concierge-medical-plans [http://perma.cc/W9QT-8ZHU] (discussing PinnacleCare Private 
Health Advisory, a Maryland direct practice that charges access subscriptions “ranging from 
$2,500 to $30,000 a year,” provides ultrapersonalized care and “has emergency physicians 
available around-the-clock and connects patients to a network of top doctors throughout the 
world”).  
 173. See Carnahan, supra note 23, at 157 (noting that, though high-end concierge practices 
are a niche market, “one would expect the[ir] proliferation . . . to be self-limiting” based upon 
limited demand). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Brennan, supra note 43, at 1190 (“We can be happy, and perhaps take some solace 
in the fact that luxury care is not becoming rapidly prevalent.”). 
 176. See CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., supra note 32, at 3 (cataloguing five large direct 
practices and reporting that they all charge inexpensive monthly access subscription prices as 
follows: (1) Iora Health: $80; (2) MedLion: $59; (3) Paladina Health: $69 to $109; (4) Qliance: 
$65; (5) White Glove Health: $35 plus $35 visit fee).  
CHAPPELL IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2017  2:13 PM 
1362  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1331 
devoid of high-end luxuries, yet they aim to preserve the longer 
doctor–patient visits and reduced waiting times that are hallmarks of 
the direct primary care model.177 Indeed, all of the larger and most 
popular franchises operating as direct practices across the country 
follow this model.178 For example, one large direct primary care 
provider, Qliance,179 reported that Medicaid programs subsidized 
about half of its estimated 35,000 patients.180 
On balance then, although none of the statutes foreclose direct 
practices from offering tiered care that could result in quality-of-care 
disparities, market realities speak loudly. And unsurprisingly, 
practitioners adopting the model seem to be listening thus far. 
Accordingly, the particular concierge model promoted by these 
statutes might itself be far less susceptible to income disparity than 
other concierge models. Perhaps it is telling then that just as the 
statutes are silent on economic disparity with respect to direct 
practices, they are equally silent on state attitudes toward “pure” 
concierge practices.  
C. Patient Abandonment 
Analyzing these statutes’ effect on patient abandonment is a 
brief exercise. Short of softening the initial blow by requiring 
adequate notice when a provider drops a patient, the statutes simply 
do not address this concern. But the same market forces that drove 
the growth in direct practices offering affordable services may 
mitigate some of these concerns. Because physicians converting to 
blue-collar concierge models are not charging exorbitant prices, more 
 
 177. See Marcia Horn Noyes, Direct Primary Care and Concierge Medicine - Spring 2015, 22 
J. ASS’N STAFF PHYSICIAN RECRUITERS 7, 8 (2015). Noyes says:  
The Izbicki’s [sic] first considered the concierge model . . . . While this ‘boutique’ 
level of care is becoming popular in places like California, Florida and Virginia, 
concierge was unlikely to thrive in fiscally conservative Erie. That’s when older 
brother Jon ran across the direct primary care ([DPC]) model, also referred to as a 
subscription or retainer model. He says, “It’s like blue collar concierge medicine – 
priced more affordably and a better fit for our community.” 
Id. (quoting Jon Izbicki).  
 178. See CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., supra note 32, at 2.  
 179. Qliance’s access subscriptions—which include unlimited doctor visits and no-wait 
phone and email access to physicians—are far from prohibitive. The company’s current rates as 
of 2015 were $59 per month for patients nineteen and younger, $79 for patients twenty through 
forty-nine, and $99 for patients fifty and over. See Pricing, QLIANCE, http://qliance.com/tables 
[http://perma.cc/8PWJ-47PJ].  
 180. David von Drehle, Medicine Is About to Get Personal, TIME (Dec. 22, 2014), 
http://time.com/3643841/medicine-gets-personal [http://perma.cc/72ND-PD7J].  
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of those doctors’ patients can follow their doctors in making the 
transition to direct primary care. A greater problem remains, 
however. Because smaller patient populations remain a hallmark of 
the direct primary care model,181 it follows that a large percentage of 
doctors’ old patients will have to be dropped upon conversion for the 
doctors to reap the benefits of transitioning. This reduction is not a 
problem if there are enough physicians to absorb terminated patients. 
But that is not always the case, as discussed below.  
D. Healthcare Access 
The statutes do not address what is perhaps the most serious 
long-term concern with all types of concierge practices: the effect of 
direct practices on healthcare access.182 Because direct practices 
derive one of their primary advantages from providing more 
extensive and personalized care to their patients in exchange for 
carefully limiting their enrollment levels,183 their increasing popularity 
could cause an aggregate reduction in nationwide healthcare access. 
This reduction could further compound a nationwide physician 
shortage that scholars estimate will grow into the tens of thousands 
within the next decade.184 Yet the statutes do not speak to this 
concern at all.185  
*        *        * 
The statutes’ effectiveness in addressing the policy concerns 
associated with concierge practices is a mixed bag. The statutes 
discuss the insurance issue most, as one of their primary functions is 
to exempt direct practices from insurance regulation. By narrowly 
recognizing a practice model that is popular because it is a cost-
effective alternative to expensive insurance policies, the statutes 
 
 181. For example, MDVIP—a Florida-based direct primary care practice with nationwide 
offices that offers subscriptions for on average $150 per month—claims that each of its 
physicians maintains a patient panel numbering 600 patients or fewer. See Member Benefits, 
MDVIP, http://www.mdvip.com/member-benefits [https://perma.cc/GS47-9VJ6].  
 182. For a discussion of contemporary concerns about shortages in healthcare access, see 
supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text.  
 183. For an explanation of business model upon which direct practices are built, see supra 
notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
 184. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH WORKFORCE ANALYSIS, supra note 61, at 2 
(projecting a shortage of 20,400 primary care physicians by 2020); Petterson et al., supra note 61, 
at 110 (estimating primary-care-physician shortages of 3,968 in 2020, 17,213 in 2025, 26,440 in 
2030, and 33,283 in 2035). 
 185. For further discussion, see supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text.  
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indirectly address the income-disparity concerns associated with 
traditional concierge practices. But the statutes do little to mitigate 
concerns about patient abandonment or to engage the burgeoning 
problem of reduced primary care access in America.186  
IV.  BROADER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: STATES AS DIRECT 
PRIMARY CARE “LABORATORIES” 
The analysis in Part III raises the question of whether these 
statutes and the models they promote are ultimately good things. 
Their place in the contemporary healthcare landscape suggests that 
they are. Despite their failure to address some of the policy concerns 
presented by the concierge model, these statutes are on balance a 
positive development in the American healthcare system. 
A. Potential Benefits of Direct Primary Care. 
Direct primary care offers numerous benefits. The allure of 
concierge practices to doctors and patients is well established and 
should not be undervalued. Although direct practices have not been 
studied in isolation, surveys have shown that doctors practicing in 
concierge practices make more money, have more time to see 
patients, and enjoy their jobs more.187 Likewise, participating patients 
report higher satisfaction with their doctors.188 Patients paying 
 
 186. See Richard A. Cooper, It’s Time to Address the Problem of Physician Shortages: 
Graduate Medical Education Is the Key, 246 ANNALS SURGERY 527, 527 (2007) (“It is now 
widely accepted that the United States is on the cusp of deepening shortages of physicians.”). 
 187. See Pasquale, supra note 39, at 52. The author discusses a survey of retainer physicians, 
noting:  
“50% of the retainer physicians said they thought they were offering more diagnostic 
and therapeutic services than traditional practices,” and “70% of retainer physicians 
said they were doing better [financially] in this type of practice than they had in 
traditional practice.” It is not hard to see why, given the numbers: “Retainer 
physicians saw an average of 11 patients per day; non-retainer physicians saw an 
average of 22 patients.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Jennifer Silverman, Retainer Practices 
Reporting Better Care, FAM. PRAC. NEWS, June 1, 2005, at 71–72); see also Robert Baror, Is 
Direct Primary Care the Future?, FED. BAR ASS’N: HEALTH L. CHECKUP ENEWSLETTER, 
http://www.fedbar.org/Sections/Health-Law-Section/Health-Law-Checkup/Is-Direct-Primary-
Care-the-Future.aspx [https://perma.cc/3LYT-CM64] (positing that direct primary care offers 
“the chance to make medicine a rewarding and enticing profession again” and that the model 
“allows physicians to simultaneously spend more time with their patients, providing enhanced 
care, while also reducing the hours they must work and increasing their quality of life”). 
 188. See Peter A. Clark, Jill R. Friedman, David W. Crosson & Matthew Fadus, Concierge 
Medicine: Medical, Legal and Ethical Perspectives, 7 INTERNET J.L. HEALTHCARE & ETHICS 1, 
4 (2011) (stating that “[d]espite the recession, renewal rates of concierge practices are 
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monthly fees for unlimited or extensive access can benefit from added 
spending predictability with respect to their primary care.189 Finally, 
the prospect of longer doctor visits, better doctor–patient 
relationships, and increased individualized care incentivizes 
preventive care and regular doctor visits, which in turn reduces the 
need for elaborate and expensive forms of reactive treatment 
resulting from preventable illnesses.190  
Nevertheless, by failing to address healthcare access, these 
statutes do not attempt to deal with a potentially serious policy 
shortcoming. Their impact will likely be negative in the short run. 
Any model that finds its greatest benefit in serving fewer patients per 
physician must necessarily add to the burgeoning shortage—
especially when doctors reduce their patient panels from 2,500 to 
500.191 As the number of these practices increases, their popularity 
could substantially impact the shortage. Given the ACA’s 
simultaneous imposition of a large number of patients onto the 
existing infrastructure (which only added to the other factors driving 
the nationwide physician shortage),192 it is hard to envision any 
positive short-term impact on healthcare access by direct practices.  
In response, proponents argue that the win–win scenario offered 
by the model will bring more doctors in to the primary care field in 
the long term.193 There, they argue that the win–win–win combination 
 
consistently very high” and that “[h]igh renewal rates . . . indicate how satisfied the patients are 
with [concierge] services”). 
 189. See Noyes, supra note 177, at 8 (discussing the affordability and predictability of 
subscription-based primary care). 
 190. See French et al., supra note 41, at 179 (“The preventive care services made available 
through increased access and physician contact time with concierge medicine have the potential 
to result in cost savings if these services avoid expensive hospital care or emergency room 
visits.”).  
 191. See Jones & Treiber, supra note 59, at 110 (citing a GAO survey that found, “on 
average, physicians decreased their patient panel from 2716 to 491 patients per year when 
making the practice conversion, an 82% reduction”). 
 192. See Tovino, supra note 8, at 2433 (“The United States has a growing population, an 
aging population, and an increasing number of residents with health insurance coverage as a 
result of the Affordable Care Act.”). 
 193. See William N. Wu, Garrison Bliss, Erika B. Bliss & Larry A. Green, A Direct Primary 
Care Medical Home: The Qliance Experience, 29 HEALTH AFF. 959, 962 (2010). The authors 
conclude:  
The direct care patient medical home model, with its smaller patient panels, ample 
time per visit, competitive pay, and manageable lifestyle, has the potential to reignite 
excitement among those considering a career in primary care. Although some argue 
that the smaller panels will exacerbate the primary care physician shortage, we 
believe that such models will slow and eventually help reverse the exodus . . . . 
Id.  
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of improved working conditions, higher revenues, and greater patient 
relationships will halt and eventually reverse the physician exodus 
from primary care as the direct primary care model expands.194 In the 
short term, they point to the accelerating rates at which primary care 
physicians are leaving the field entirely and argue that direct practices 
oftentimes “catch” otherwise-inevitable deserters.195 Put simply, their 
argument implies that a doctor who treats fewer patients than he did 
before is still better than a doctor who treats no one. However, these 
proponents’ short-term argument is anecdotal, and their long-term 
argument is speculative, as there is scant empirical data upon which to 
evaluate either side’s claims.196 This speculation will continue until 
there are enough practices to adequately measure their impact on the 
healthcare marketplace.197 
B. Federalism: An Appropriate Testing Ground for the Model 
However, this uncertainty is a primary reason that federalism is 
particularly appropriate in this context. Simply put, no one knows 
whether the proven benefits of direct primary care outweigh their 
potentially negative impacts on healthcare access or even whether 
they will negatively impact access at all. So neither full-throated 
endorsement nor wholesale disqualification at the federal level is 
appropriate. The former would constitute a risky endorsement of an 
innovation whose shakedown cruise is far from complete, and the 
latter would effectively foreclose a promising delivery model with 
some demonstrated and possibly scalable benefits. Thus, 
experimentation at a more limited level seems warranted, especially 
because this innovation was likely slowed for years by considerable 
legal uncertainty.  
 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Thomas S. Huddle & Robert M. Centor, Retainer Medicine: An Ethically 
Legitimate Form of Practice that Can Improve Primary Care, 155 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 633, 
634–35 (2011). The authors discuss physician retention and say:  
We predict that retainer physicians would find any ethical condemnation of retainer 
practice . . . to be highly implausible, so much so that, far from impelling such 
physicians to return to more usual forms of primary care practice, it would most likely 
lead to the loss of physicians from primary care altogether. 
Id. 
 196. See French et al., supra note 41, at 180 (“[F]ew scientific studies have evaluated the 
clinical, economic, and policy impact of concierge medicine and virtually no long-term 
information is available.”). 
 197. See id. (“Quality longitudinal data are scarce . . . .”). 
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Furthermore, the physician shortage is itself a decentralized 
issue: the shortage is neither equally distributed among the states nor 
attributable to a shared cause.198 Analysts attribute the shortage to a 
mosaic of systemic problems that vary by jurisdiction, including 
problems with attracting medical students into primary practice, 
growing residency shortages, soaring education debt, and declining 
physician incomes.199 And predictably, the shortage is greatest in rural 
and low-income jurisdictions.200 The shortage is not so much a 
uniform nationwide shortage as much as it is a patchwork of regional 
or local shortages being driven by various combinations of locale-
specific factors.  
Given the decentralized nature of the physician shortage, these 
statutes are appropriate vehicles to test direct primary care’s 
scalability and impact on the national healthcare market before 
betting the proverbial farm in additional states or at the national 
level. By legitimizing the direct practice model, states can gauge the 
model’s interplay with other initiatives to grow the physician 
population.201 They can test the validity of their proponents’ 
arguments about their ability to attract more primary care doctors in 
the long term while monitoring their short-term effects. Interestingly, 
many of the early-moving states that have recently passed direct 
 
 198. See Leighton Ku et al., The States’ Next Challenge—Securing Primary Care for 
Expanded Medicaid Populations, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 493, 494 (2011) (projecting Oklahoma 
to have the highest Medicaid expansion relative to its primary care physician population—more 
than double the national average and six times more than Massachusetts, the state with the 
lowest projected shortage). 
 199. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Access to Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality, 19 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 269, 288 (2010) (“The physician shortage is exacerbated by physician 
maldistribution.”); Tovino, supra note 8, at 2433 (“The nation’s doctor shortages should not 
come as a surprise. The United States has a growing population, an aging population, and an 
increasing number of residents with health insurance coverage as a result of the Affordable 
Care Act.”); id. at 2477 (“Today, these [funding] caps significantly limit the ability of teaching 
hospitals located in physician-shortage areas to grow their residency programs and train 
physicians who might stay and practice medicine in needed specialty areas . . . .”).  
 200. See, e.g., Candice Chen et al., Toward Graduate Medical Education (GME) 
Accountability: Measuring the Outcomes of GME Institutions, 88 ACAD. MED. 1267, 1267 (2013) 
(“Despite . . . public investment [in graduate medical education], physician shortages in certain 
specialties, including primary care, general surgery, and psychiatry, and in rural and 
underserved areas, persist.”). 
 201. See, e.g., Michael Ollove, Rural Doctor Shortage Spurs States to Act, PBS NEWSHOUR: 
THE RUNDOWN (June 10, 2016, 11:34 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/rural-
doctor-shortage-spurs-states-to-act [https://perma.cc/JM8W-BJQS] (describing various states’ 
initiatives to remedy their respective doctor shortages). 
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practice statutes are also experiencing the greatest doctor shortages.202 
A prime opportunity thus exists to put direct practices through worst-
case scenario testing by legitimizing them in several of the regions 
that are already experiencing shortages. As a result, states that have 
taken a wait-and-see approach on direct practices will have the 
opportunity to gauge the model’s viability in difficult access 
conditions. Based on those observations, they can then either adopt 
their own statutes with enhanced corrections to remedy the mistakes 
made by early-mover states or throw out direct practices entirely by 
simply defining them as insurers. Meanwhile, federal policymakers 
can examine these impacts and further flesh out the best way to 
harmonize the direct primary care model with the federal insurance 
infrastructure, whether the ACA or a replacement plan governs that 
infrastructure.  
In that sense, these statutes are a modern, albeit perhaps 
unintentional, example of cooperative federalism—that is, states 
filling in the microscopic-level regulatory gaps in a macroscopic 
federal regulatory scheme.203 Here, the macroscopic scheme is the 
broad federal insurance framework designed to increase access, lower 
costs, and improve delivery.204 The state gap-filling function concerns 
delivery improvement.205 Further, this arrangement leaves discretion 
to the states to examine the impact of direct practices on healthcare 
access and tailor their regulatory approaches to address the 
jurisdiction-specific causes of their respective doctor shortages. Put 
another way, by putting both proponents’ and critics’ arguments to 
the test, states will learn whether these practices can in fact have a 
role in solving the impending doctor shortage. The ACA certainly left 
room for states to experiment with possible solutions to further 
 
 202. See Ku et al., supra note 198, at 494 (estimating the following states in order of most 
severe primary care shortage: Oklahoma—1st, Texas—3rd, Louisiana—4th, Arkansas—5th, 
Mississippi—14th). Interestingly, Washington—one of the first states to recognize direct 
practices—is projected to rank 44th. Id.  
 203. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 
79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001) (“[C]ooperative federalism envisions a sharing of regulatory 
authority between the federal government and the states that allows states to regulate within a 
framework delineated by federal law.”). 
 204. See DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMM., THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT 1 (2010), https://www.dpc.senate.gov/healthreformbill/healthbill04.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZWQ5-LYFV] (“The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act will ensure that all 
Americans have access to quality, affordable health care and will create the transformation 
within the health care system necessary to contain costs.”).  
 205. It might also operate in the area of cost, but that determination is merely speculative at 
this point. 
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improve delivery and access.206 Further, proposed ACA replacements 
heavily emphasize state experimentation and market-driven 
innovations.207 Thus, those states that have chosen to recognize the 
direct primary care model can determine whether it can play a role in 
addressing this problem. This innovation-testing arrangement is what 
ultimately answers the broader question posed by its evolution: these 
statutes—and the delivery models they endorse—are meritorious 
developments in the American healthcare landscape. 
CONCLUSION 
The direct primary care statutes are a unique example of 
innovation in a highly regulated industry. Furthermore, they 
represent an example of unintended, yet still cooperative, federalism 
in a partisan political climate. Indeed, states considered to be 
primarily conservative, liberal, and moderate have passed these 
statutes. It is rare to see a Louisiana statute modeled directly after a 
Washington statute, but that is exactly the case here. Although the 
statutes simultaneously promote and regulate a growing trend in the 
healthcare industry, their effectiveness in addressing several 
longstanding policy concerns associated with concierge practices is a 
decidedly mixed bag. Nevertheless, these statutes’ greatest asset lies 
within their principle rather than their language. That principle—
empirically testing the virtues of policy innovation—is particularly 
appropriate here, where an untested innovation with considerable 
promise has grafted itself onto a complex and high-risk industry. 
Thus, the concept of states as laboratories of democracy208 works 
 
 206. See 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012) (allowing states to apply for a “waiver for state 
innovation,” which exempts states from the ACA’s insurance requirements upon successful 
submission of an alternative proposal); Ctr. For Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Ctrs. For 
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Section 1332: State Innovation Waivers, CMS.GOV, 
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/State-Innovation-
Waivers/Section_1332_state_Innovation_Waivers-.html [https://perma.cc/MVL9-42Q5] 
(“Section 1332 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) permits a state to apply for a State 
Innovation Waiver to pursue innovative strategies for providing their residents with access to 
high quality, affordable health insurance while retaining the basic protections of the ACA.”). 
 207. See, e.g., Antos & Capretta, supra note 119 (describing the various ways in which the 
House Republicans’ 2016 ACA-replacement plan propose to incentivize state experimentation 
and innovation, including $25 billion in federal funds for “statewide reform efforts,” potential 
grants for improving care quality and insurance access, and “bonus payments” based on 
demonstrated reform progress). 
 208. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (1932) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its 
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particularly well in this context: the states that have chosen to 
recognize the direct primary care model can actively test whether that 
model alleviates or exacerbates the symptoms associated with their 
systemic doctor shortages. 
In sum, direct practices present some promising benefits while 
also creating some concerning potential dilemmas. Each of these 
potential benefits, along with their potential harmful effects, are 
made testable by the state action discussed here. These statutes 
promote an experimental, innovative delivery model in full 
accordance with the end goals of state and federal policymakers alike. 
And that is indeed “a big [expletive] deal.”209 
 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 209. Weiner, supra note 1. 
